CRISTINA BICCHIERI

466 Logan Hall

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, PA 19104

Phone # (215) 898-5820

e-mail:  cb36@sas.upenn.edu

Education

Cambridge University -- Ph.D: Philosophy of Science, 1984

Harvard University -- Ford Fellow in Philosophy and Economics, 1980-82

Cambridge University -- M.Phil.: Philosophy and Economics, 1979

Universita` di Milano -- Laurea (Honors): Philosophy of Science, 1976

Academic Positions

2004-present:  Carol and Michael Lowenstein Endowed Term Chair and Professor of Philosophy.

Director: Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program, University of Pennsylvania

1995 - 2004: Professor of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University

Adjunct Professor, Dept. of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh

1989 - 1995: Associate Professor of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University

1986 - 1989:  Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame

1984 - 1986: Assistant Professor of Economics and Philosophy, Barnard College and Columbia University

Visiting Positions

Spring 2004:  Visiting Professor, University of Pennsylvania

May-July 1997:  Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of California, Irvine

Spring 1996:  Visiting Professor and Leverhulme Trust Fellow, The London School of Economics

Fall 1994:  Visiting Professor, DIPSCO, Center for Cognitive Science, H.S. Raffaele, Milano

Spring 1994: Visiting Professor, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, University of Jerusalem

March-July 1993:  Visiting Professor, Center for Advanced Studies, University of Jerusalem

Summer 1988:  Visiting Professor, Istituto Universitario Europeo, Firenze

1987-88:  Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Chicago

Spring 1983: Visiting Professor, University of Torino

Honors and Fellowships

Who's Who in Science and Engineering Education

2001 - 2002: Fellow, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Studies)

Spring 1998: Fellow, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala.

Research Associate, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1989-present.

Spring 1996: Leverhulme Trust Senior Fellow, The London School of Economics

Summer 1994:  Fellow, Summer Institute on Aspects of rational Behavior in Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1987 – 1989:  Research Fellow, Center for Ethics, Rationality and Society. University of Chicago

Fall 1985:  Senior Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science. University of Pittsburgh

1980- 81:  Ford Foundation Fellow, Harvard University

1978- 80:  Ribband Scholar, Wolfson College, Cambridge University

1977:  Fellow, Fondazione Einaudi

1976:  Fellow, Fondazione Feltrinelli

 Grants

The Logic and Strategy of Distributed Agents, International Workshop, NSF Computation and Social Systems Program, December 2000

Game-theoretic Foundations for Multi-agent Systems, 3 years. PI: C. Bicchieri, NSF Computation and Social Systems Program, 1998 - 2001

Coordination and Cooperation among Tactical Picture Agents (with M. Pollack), Office of Naval Research, 1995 - 1997

Faculty Development Fund Grants, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1998

NSF Grant for US-Italy Workshop on Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, 1992

National Research Council Grant, 1991

NSF Grant in History and Philosophy of Science, PI: C. Bicchieri, 1987 - 1989

National Research Council Grant, 1987

CNR Grant, 1980 - 1982

Professional Activities

Chair of the PSA Program Committee, 2006

NSF Panelist, Human and Social Dynamics, National Science Foundation, August 2004

Member of the Advisory Board, Philosophical Gourmet Report, 2002 - present

Program committee, PSA 2004

Program committee, TARK IX  (Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge) Conference, Indiana, 2003.

Program Committee, AAAI 2003 Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, Melbourne, 2003

Program Committee, Social Norms Workshop, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, May 2002.

Program Committee, AAAI 2001 Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, Stanford, March 2001

Chair of the Program Committee, NSF-CNR Workshop on The Logic and Strategy of Distributed Agents, Trento, December 2000

NSF Panelist, Computational Social Science, Spring 2000

Program committee, TARK VII (Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge) Conference, Chicago, July 1998.

Program Committee, Second International Conference on Multiagent Systems, workshop on "Norms, Obligations and Conventions", December 1996, Kyoto

Symposium Chair, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meetings, Chicago, April 1995

Chair, Symposium on Games, Explanations, Authority, and Justification, Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, New Orleans, October 1994

Chair, Decision Theory Symposium, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meetings, May 1994

Co-organizer, Pitt-CMU Rationality Seminar, 1994-95

Program Committee, Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, 1992

Chair, Rational Deliberation Symposium, Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, October 1992

Co-organizer, Second Workshop on Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello, June 1992

Program committee, TARK III Conference,  March 1990

Co-organizer, First Workshop on Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello, June 1989

Chair, Symposium on Game Theory, Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, Evanston, October  1988.

Editorial Boards:  Economics and Philosophy 1989-95.  Mind and Society 2001- present.  Filosofia e Questioni Pubbliche 1996-present

Association Memberships:  Charter Member of the Game Theory Society.  Philosophy of Science Association, American Political Science Association, American Economic Association, American Association for Artificial Intelligence, Societa` Italiana di Storia e Filosofia della Scienza.

Publications: Books

The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge University Press, 2006

Rationality and Coordination, Cambridge University Press, 1993; Second edition, 1997. Italian edition, Feltrinelli, 1998

The Logic of Strategy, C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms, Oxford University Press, 1999

The Dynamics of Norms, C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms, Cambridge University Press, 1997

Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, edited by C. Bicchieri and M.L. Dalla Chiara, Cambridge University Press, 1992

Ragioni per Credere, Ragioni per Fare. Convenzioni eVincoli nel Metodo Scientifico.  Feltrinelli, Milano, 1988

Publications: Articles

“The Evolution of Fairness” (with J. Alexander), submitted.

“Trust among Strangers” (with J.Duffy and G. Tolle), Philosophy of Science  71: 1-34, 2004

“Can Groups be Trusted? An Experimental Study of Collective Trust” (with B. McEvily, R. Weber and V. Ho), in R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer (eds.) The Handbook of Trust. Edward Elgar publishing, 2006

“A Matter of Trust:  Accountability in Italian Politics 1990-2000 "(with R. Mudambi and P. Navarra), Mind and Society, 2005

 “Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information" (with H. Arlo-Costa), submitted

“Cooperation and Communication: Group Identity or Social Norms?”, in N. Gold (ed.) Teamwork. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

“Rationality and Game Theory”, in The Handbook of Rationality, The Oxford Reference Library of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2003

“Game Theory: Nash equilibrium”, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information, Blackwell 2003

Review of C. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society, Journal of Economic Literature, June 2003.

“Covenants without Swords:  group identity, norms, and communication in social dilemmas”, Rationality and Society  14(2): 192-228, 2002

Words and Deeds: A Focus Theory of Norms, in J. Nida-Rumelin and W. Spohn (eds.), Practical Rationality, Rules, and Structure, Theory and Decision Library, Kluwer 2000.

Local Fairness, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIX, 1, 1999.

The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms (with Y. Fukui), Business Ethics Quarterly 9: 127-155, 1999.  Also appearing in A. Pagnini and M.C. Galavotti (eds.), Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation, Kluwer 1999.

Games and Conditionals (with H. Arlo-Costa), in I. Gilboa (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann, 1998.

Decision and Game Theory, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998.

The Potential for the Evolution of Cooperation among Web Agents (with M. Pollack, C. Rovelli and I. Tsamardinos), International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 48: 9-29, 1998.

Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisonerís Dilemma (with M. Green), in G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory: The Philosophy and Logic of Social Action, Kluwer, 1997

Common Reasoning about Admissibility (with O. Schulte), Erkenntnis 45, 1997

Corruption Cycles (with J. Duffy), Political Studies 45, vol.3, 1997

Learning to Cooperate in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms (eds.), The Dynamics of Norms, Cambridge University Press 1997

Games Servers Play: A Procedural Approach (with E. Ephrati and A. Antonelli), in M. Wooldridge, J. Mueller and M.Tambe, (eds.) Intelligent Agents, Springer-Verlag 1996.

Game-theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge (with G. A. Antonelli), Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4, 1995

Evolution and Revolution: The Dynamics of Corruption (with C. Rovelli), Rationality and Society 7, 1995.

The Epistemic Foundations of Nash Equilibrium in D. Little (ed.) On the Reliability of Economic Models: Essays in the Philosophy of Economics, Kluwer 1995.

Counterfactuals, Belief Changes, and Equilibrium Refinements, Philosophical Topics 21, 1994.

Backwards Forward Induction (with G. A. Antonelli), in R. Fagin (ed.) Reasoning about Knowledge, Morgan Kauffmann 1994.

Norme di Cooperazione, Sistemi Intelligenti, April 1994.

Review of B. Skyrms's The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 1993.

Two Kinds of Rationality in N. De Marchi (ed.) Post-Popperian Methodology of Economics, Kluwer 1992.

Comments on Janssen and Rosemberg papers in N. De Marchi (ed.) Post-Popperian Methodology of Economics, Kluwer 1992.

Knowledge-Dependent Games: Backward Induction in C. Bicchieri and M.L. Dalla Chiara (eds.) Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press 1992.

Reasoning from Bounded Knowledge, Economics and Artificial Intelligence, Pergamon Press 1991.

Backward Induction without Common Knowledge, Proceedings of the 1988 Biennial Meeting, Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 2: 329-343.

Norms of Cooperation, Ethics 100, 1990: 838-861.

Paradoxes of Rationality, Midwest Studies in Philosophy: The Philosophy of the Human Sciences, vol. XV, 1990: 65-79.

Progress without Growth? The Case of the Marginalist Revolution in Economics, Ricerche Economiche 1-2, 1989: 236-255.

Counterfactuals and Backward Induction, Philosophica 44, 1989: 101-118.

Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge , Erkenntnis 30, 1989: 69-85.

Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals, Synthese 76, 1988: 135-169.

Common Knowledge and Backward Induction: A Solution to the Paradox, in M. Vardi (ed.) Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos 1988

Methodological Rules as Conventions, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18, 1988: 477-495.

Should a Scientist Abstain from Metaphor?, in A. Klamer, D. McCloskey and R. Solow (eds.) The Consequences of Economic Rhetoric. Cambridge University Press 1988.

Game Theory and Counterfactuals, Proceedings of the International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Moscow, August 1987.

Rationality and Predictability in Economics, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38, 1987: 501-513.

Review of S.C. Kolm, Le Contrat Social Liberal and Le Liberalisme Moderne, Ethics 98, 1987: 185-190.

Insufficient Rationality, in G.Urbani (ed.), Economia e Politica. Franco Angeli, Milano 1987.

Inferire si deve da e`, in S.Veca (ed.), Filosofia, Politica e Societa`, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1987.

Le Regole Metodologiche come Convenzioni, Nuova Civilta` delle Macchine 3/4, 1986: 89-100.

Rationality, Expectations, and Positive Economics, Proceedings of the History of Economics Society, George Mason University, May 1985.

Primary Goods and Rawlsian Redistribution: an Overlapping Generations Model, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 4, 1984: 471-498.

Economic Welfare and the Distribution of Economic Advantages: Individual Rights versus Common Goals, Economic Notes 1, 1983: 59-77.

Property Rights and Marginal Products, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 1-2, 1982: 3-22.

Utilita`, Contratto, Equita`: I Problemi della Giustizia, Problemi della Transizione 9, 1982: 80-90.

Individual Rationality and Collective Choice, in Modelli di Razionalita` nelle Scienze Economico -Sociali. Arsenale Editrice, Modena 1982.

Methodological Individualism and Rationality, Quaderni Feltrinelli 7-8, 1981.

Introduction to the Italian edition of M. B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science. Feltrinelli, Milano 1980.

Values, Change, and Ideology in the Social and Natural Sciences, Quaderni Feltrinelli 4-5, 1980.

On the Logic of Economic Model Building, Economic Notes 2, 1979: 83-88.

Values and Positive Knowledge in Economics, Note Economiche 2-3, 1979: 147-179.

Restructuring the Social Sciences?, Scientia 1, 1978: 1071-1075.

Invited Lectures and Conferences

“The Methodology of Economic Experiments”, Invited Lecture. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, June 2005.

American Psychological Society 17th Annual Convention. Los Angeles, May 2005, “Ultimatums and Fairness: Social Preferences or Social Norms?” Invited Presentation.

FEW conference, University of Texas at Austin, May 2005, “Experimental Games I and II”. Tutorial.

Workshop on The Social Dynamics of Decision Making. Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Austin, Texas, November 2004, “The Emergence of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game”.

“Ultimatums, Fairness, and Social Norms”. Philosophy Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, October 29, 2004

“A Taste for Fairness: Social Preferences vs. Social Norms Explanations of Behavior in Ultimatum and Dictator games”. Decision Process Seminar, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, October 4 2004.

ECPR, European Political Science Association Meetings, Marburg, June 2004 “Why did they march?  Networks, beliefs and public policy change.”

2nd International Conference on Reasoning and Decision Making, Padova, March 2003, “Ultimatum Games: Social Preferences or Fairness Norms?”

University of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Philosophy, “"How bad norms are born: Pluralistic ignorance and informational cascades", January 2003

American Economic Association, ESA II, “Social Norms: A cognitive view”, Washington, December 2002

Wissenshaftskolleg zu Berlin, Workshop on Social Norms, “Lewis: common knowledge and common belief”, May 2002

Wissenshaftskolleg zu Berlin, Workshop on Meaning and Normativity, “What game theory teaches us about norms”, April 2002

ZIF, University of Bielefeld, “Pluralistic ignorance, informational cascades, and the survival of inefficient norms”, April 2002

University of Trento, Italy, Dept. of Cognitive Science, “Social Learning”, March 2002

Guest speaker, Seventh International Colloquium on Cognitive Science, ICCS-01, Donostia - San Sebastian, Spain, May 2001

Santa Fe Institute Workshop on Coevolution of Preferences and Institutions, “Trust among strangers”, January 2001

Guest speaker, Congress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy, Bielefeld, September 2000.

University of Trento, Italy, Dept. of Computer Science, “Games and conditionals”,  June 2000

University of Arizona, Tucson, Center for Cognitive Science, “Communication among

strangers: social norms versus ingroup identification in experimental  social dilemmas”, February 2000.

The Brookings Institution, Washington, Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, “Trust and social distance”, November 1999

University of California, Berkeley, Law School, Workshop on Rationality and Society, “Covenants without the sword:  Communication and cooperation in social dilemmas”, October 1999

Associazione Sigismondo Malatesta, Conference on Strategic Rationality in Economics, “Communication among strangers: the role of social norms versus ingroup identification in promoting cooperative behavior in experimental social dilemmas”, August 1999

University of Oxford, EAESP Conference, “Group identity explanations”  , August 1999

University of Trento, Economics Department, “Cooperation in social dilemmas: Group identity or social norms?”, July 1999

University of Florence, Philosophy Department, “How to model rational choices with irrational outcomes”, May 1999

University of Oxford, Seminar on Theories of Groups, “Social learning, informational cascades, and the dynamics of norms”, May 1999

University of Missouri, Colombia, Philosophy and Politics Departments, “Ultimatums, dictators and fairness”, April 1999

University of California, Irvine, School of Social Sciences, “The evolution of Norms”, March 1999

University of Pittsburgh, Conference on Cause, Belief and Strategy, “Social learning, informational cascades and the microdynamics of norms”, November 1998.

TARK Conference, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., “Games and Conditionals”, July 1998.

Northwestern University Microeconomics Theory Summer Workshop, Round Table Discussion: “Common knowledge of rationality and the backwards induction solution for games of perfect information”, July 1998

University of Maryland,  Collective Choice Center Conference on Norms, “Why Unpopular Norms Survive”, June 1998.

Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, “Words and Deeds: A Focus Theory of Norms”, May 1998.

University of Cincinnati Colloquium: Perspectives on Rationality -- Rules of Thought and Action, “Group Identity, Cooperation and Competition”, May 1998

University of Bielefeld, Conference on Practical Rationality, Rules and Structure, “The Dynamics of Rules”, March 1998

Yale University, Philosophy Department, “Rationality in Games”, January 1998.

University of California, Irvine, Dept. of Philosophy, “The Dynamics of Norms”, May 1997.

University of Indiana, Bloomington, Dept. of History and Philosophy of Science “Pluralistic Ignorance, Informational Cascades,  and the Survival of Inefficient Norms”, January 1997.

Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, "Common Reasoning about Admissibility", August 1996.

University of Nottingham, Government Department, "Corruption Cycles", June 1996.

Centro Fiorentino di Storia e Filosofia della Scienza, Conference in honor of W. and M. Salmon, Firenze, "Pluralistic Ignorance and the Survival of Inefficient Norms", May 1996.

Third International Fellows Conference, Center for Philosophy of Science, Castiglioncello, "Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma", May 1996.

Oxford University, Nuffield College, "Is Corruption a Cyclical Phenomenon?", April 1996.

LSE Center for Pure and Applied Mathematics, "An Economic Model of Corruption", March 1996.

International Conference on Game Theory and Applications, Jerusalem, “ Defeasible game theory”, June 1995

University of California, Irvine, "How to play games: the nuts and bolts of strategic encounters", December 1995

Caltech, "An Economic Model of Corruption", December 1995

IJCAI Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures and Languages, Montreal, "Games Servers Play: A Procedural Approach",  August 1995

X International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Florence, "Defeasible Game Theory", August 1995

Game Theory and Applications Conference,  Jerusalem, "Default Reasoning in Games", June 1995

Probability, Dynamics and Causality Conference, Luino, "Choice and Prediction: on the Symmetry Argument for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma", June 1995

Conference on Rationality and Politics, Center of Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, "An Evolutionary Model of Corruption", March 1995

DISPCO, Center for Cognitive Science, H. S. Raffaele, Milano, "Cooperation and Coordination in Multi-Agent Systems", December 1994

International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook, "Forward Induction", July 1994

Center for Advanced Studies, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, "The Dynamics of Corruption", June 1994

Economics Department, University of Rotterdam, "When it is Better to be Ignorant", May 1994

Economics Department, Università Cattolica, Milano, "Forward Induction", May 1994

DIPSCO, Milano, "The Dynamics of Norms", May 1994.

Center for Cognitive Science, CNR, Roma, "Game Theory and Artificial Intelligence", May 1994

TARK V Conference, Pacific Grove, "Backwards Forward Induction", March 1994.

Conference on Game Theory and the Evolution of Norms, Philosophy Department, University of Western Ontario, Canada, "What are Norms?", January 1994.

Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Pennsylvania, "Logic and Game Theory: How to Model Players' Reasoning", October 1993.

Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, "Bounded Reasoning and Reasonable Solutions in Games", September 1993.

Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, "An Axiomatic Approach to Bounded Knowledge and Local Rationality in Game Theory", August 1993.

Nobel Symposium in Game Theory, Sweden, “Game-theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge”, June 1993.

Economics Department, University of Rotterdam, "The Emergence of Conventions and Norms", June 1993.

Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, “Counterfactuals and Equilibrium Refinements”, May 1993.

The Social Contract and Democracy Conference, University of California at Irvine, “Learning and Evolution: the Emergence of Norms”, December 1992.

Economics Department, Queens University, Canada, “Counterfactuals, Belief Change, and Equilibrium Refinements”, October 1992.

Second Workshop on Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello, Italy, “Norms of Cooperation”,  June 1992.

Conference on Knowledge and Game Theory, “Can Free Choice be Known?”, State University of New York at Stony Brook, July 1992.

MAAMAW 1992, Workshop on Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Roma, “AI and game Theory: from Distributed Knowledge to Common Knowledge”, July 1992.

Workshop on Cooperation and Dynamics in Games, Northwestern University, “Learning to Cooperate”, August 1992.

TIMS/ORSA, Orlando, "Belief Revision in the Extensive Form", April 1992.

Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Informazione, Universita` di Milano, "Bounded Knowledge and the Backward Induction Paradoxes", December 1991.

Conference on Problems of Idealization in Economics, Tilburg, "Game-theoretic Predictions", July 1991.

International Game Theory Conference, Florence, "Paradoxes of Rationality", June 1991.

Bridging Philosophy and Literature Colloquium, Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh, "Metaphor and the Search for Truth", February 1991.

Conference on the History of Game Theory, Duke University, "Game Theory and Philosophy", October 1990.

Second International Conference on Economics and Artificial Intelligence, CECOIA II, Paris, "Reasoning from Bounded Knowledge", July 1990,

Center for Economic Research, University of Tilburg, "Backwards Induction", July 1990.

Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, "Rationality", May 1990.

CREA, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, "Paradoxes of Rationality", March 1990.

Economics Department, SUNY at Stony Brook, "Backward Induction without Common Knowledge", October 1989.

Workshop on Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello (Italy), "Information and Communication in Games", June 1989.

Ethics Conference on Norms, Chicago, "Learning to Cooperate", May 1989.

Markets and Political Theory Conference, Williams College, Commentator of J. Hampton, "Constrained maximization and the Nature of Reason", April 1989.

Centre de Recherche de Mathematique de la Decision, CNRS, Universite` de Paris-Dauphine, "Paradoxes of Backward Induction", March 1989.

Philosophy of Science Colloquium, The London School of Economics, "Self-refuting Theories  of Strategic Interaction", October 1988.

Philosophy of Science Seminar, Cambridge University, "The Strategic Use of Knowledge: Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma", October 1988.

Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, Evanston, "Manipulability of Knowledge in Strategic Contexts", October 1988.

American Political Philosophy Conference, Napoli, Commentator to T. Nagel, June 1988.

TARK II Conference, Pacific Grove, "Common Knowledge and Backward Induction: A Solution to the Paradox", March 1988.

Istituto Universitario Europeo, Firenze, "Methodological Conventions",  February 1988.

Istituto Universitario Europeo, Firenze, "The Use of Counterfactuals in Game Theory", February 1988.

Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, "Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge", November 1987.

Philosophy Department, Northwestern University, "Can Rationality Become Common Knowledge?", November 1987.

Center for Ethics, Rationality and Society, University of Chicago, "Common Knowledge of Rationality", October 1987.

International  Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Moscow, "Game Theory and Counterfactuals", August 1987.

Economics Department, Duke University, "Game Theory and Counterfactuals", February 1987.

Commentator, Foundations of Probability Session, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meetings, Chicago, 1987.

Conference on Testing Theories of Scientific Change, Virginia Politechnic Institute, "Progress Without Growth? The Case of the 'Marginalist Revolution' in Economics", October 1986. Also presented at the History of Economics Meetings, Harvard University, May 1987.

Conference on The Rhetoric of Economics, Wellesley College, "Should a Scientist Abstain from Metaphor?", May 1986.

Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, "Rationality and Predictability in Economics", October 1985. Also presented at the Philosophy Colloquium, University of Chicago, October 1986.

Philosophy Colloquium, University of Pittsburgh, "Methodological Rules as Conventions", December 1985.

Philosophy Colloquium, Columbia University, "Rationality, Expectations, and Positive Economics", May 1985. Also presented at the History of Economics Society Meetings, George Mason University, May 1985.