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I am most interested in mental states that don't fit the usual philosophical model of propositional thought, and in the verbal expression of such states. In the realm of human thought, I'm especially interested in what I call "aspectual thinking": thought in which one mental representation structures and organizes our thinking about something else. Metaphor is perhaps the most prominent and forceful example here, but I think aspectual thought plays an important role in other areas as well, including fiction. In the realm of non-human thought, I've been thinking about whether thought is possible in the absence of language, and specifically whether any animals other than us possess and deploy concepts. In addition to these broad areas, I'm also interested in the emotions, and in the role that aspects can play in visual experience, as for example when we see a cloud as an elephant. |
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"Metaphor and That Certain 'Je Ne Sais Quoi'" Philosophical Studies 129:1 (May 2006), 1-25.
"Contextualism, Metaphor, and What is Said" Mind & Language, 21:3 (June 2006), 280-309.
"Metaphor in the Mind: The Cognition of Metaphor" Philosophy Compass 1:2 (March 2006), 154-170.
"The Generality Constraint, Nonsense, and Categorial Restrictions" Philosophical Quarterly 54:215 (April 2004), 209-231.
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